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theory is offered to help the reader understand how to break the will of
fanatics.
In a long, intricate work there are
bound to be contradictions, but when
they cut to the core of the argument,
they become disconcerting. For example, one reads: “In effects-based operations, therefore, actions and their
effects are not and cannot be isolated.
They are interrelated.” But later the author writes, “If those disproportionate
effects are to shape behavior in the direction we want, however, we must figure out first how to trace the path of an
action to a certain effect, and then how
to plan the right actions to set the chain
in motion.”
None of this means that effects-based
operations should not be pursued—
only that Smith does not have it quite
right. Better, one should think carefully
about EBO in terms of objectives. Rear
Admiral Henry Eccles provided in these
pages over twenty years ago the key insight in this regard: “The objectives represent ‘the effect desired,’ what one is
seeking to achieve by the use of military
force.” Eccles guides one to the recognition that the selection of objectives provides the desired effect—hence the basis
for effects-based warfare. Of course,
one can select objectives for which the
effects either are monumentally difficult to achieve or can never be clearly
determined. To change the will of, say,
Osama Bin Laden falls squarely in this
latter category.
Unfortunately, the publisher of this
book did not do Smith or his readers any
favor by printing the text in a sans-serif
font in a fully justified format. There is
a reason why books and newspapers use
serif fonts—“kerning” of letters and
words makes them significantly easier
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to read in small type sizes. The book
also lacks an index, which makes finding items quite a feat, and the footnotes
do not correlate with the text.
Effects Based Operations is presented in
the first person plural. Employment of
the first person plural has two serious
drawbacks—consistency and advocacy.
On some pages “we” takes on at least
three separate meanings—U.S. decision
makers, the author himself, and the author and his reader. In other places
“we” appears to refer to the U.S. Navy,
and elsewhere to U.S. military forces.
This proves rather confusing for the
reader, who is continually challenged to
discern to whom the author is referring.
Use of the first person, moreover, gives
this book the tang of an in-house, partisan staff study rather than a dispassionate analysis.
Finally, the bibliography is thin, omitting such important works as General
David Deptula’s Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare
(Aerospace Education Foundation,
2001) and Paul Davis’s Effects-Based
Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge
for the Analytical Community (RAND,
2001).
All in all, this book was a disappointment, weighed down by its length, its
complexity, and its many flaws.
ROGER W. BARNETT

Professor Emeritus
Naval War College

Voorhees, James. Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2002. 470pp. $24.95
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For over thirty years, the Dartmouth
Conference has been a multifaceted
arena for sustained dialogue between
the United States and the Soviet Union
(later the Russian Federation). The conference, structured in plenary meetings
and task forces, enabled the two superpower adversaries to edge slowly toward greater understanding. It was one
of the earliest efforts to engage the Soviets outside of official channels, and it
succeeded, although sometimes in Cold
War fits and starts, by bringing together
a consistent group of experts.
In his detailed history of the Dartmouth
Conference, James Voorhees connects
first-person reflections and memories
of the participants with documentation
of Dartmouth planning and reporting.
He also undertakes a thorough review
of the literature and engages two longtime conference participants, Harold
Saunders and Vitaly Zhurkin, to analyze the lessons learned.
All three are well placed to reflect upon
the value of the Dartmouth process.
Voorhees is an associate of, and
Saunders is the director of international
affairs at, the Kettering Foundation, the
institution that funded the conference
for many years and served as its intellectual “home.” Zhurkin, director emeritus
of the Institute of Europe in the Russian
Academy of Sciences, began his participation with the conference in 1971.
The result is a book that brings the
Dartmouth process alive against the
backdrop of key events in the U.S.Russian relationship, beginning in the
1950s and extending almost to the present day. In that respect, it is good reading for anyone interested in the history
of the Cold War.
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This work is also important because it
describes the continuing value of the
process. Yevgeny Primakov, a long-time
participant, expressed this well when he
wrote to Saunders during the book’s
preparation: “The whole history of the
Dartmouth meetings demonstrates the
usefulness of such non-official group[s].
. . .[F]ormal contacts do not exclude
the necessity of non-official exchange of
opinions in particular between those
people who have the capability to report their impressions and conclusions
after such exchanges to the highest state
officials.”
Furthermore, the process has had valuable offshoots, such as the Inter-Tajik
Dialogue, which Saunders cochaired
from its inception. The dialogue has
been effective in resolving what seemed
to be an intractable civil war in
Tajikistan. Dartmouth, in short, has
given birth to some productive notions
of conflict resolution, and Voorhees,
Saunders, and Zhurkin describe their
potential well.
The book’s shortcomings are in two
areas. First, its description of government
policy making falls prey to oversimplification. Anyone who believes that political appointees stick to making policy
and professional bureaucrats stick to
implementing it has never watched the
British television comedy Yes, Prime
Minister, the classic program that
chronicles relations between minister
and mandarin in the British government. Its lessons apply equally well in
Washington, and probably also in Moscow. That aside, if the book had acknowledged more of a symbiotic
relationship between political appointees and bureaucrats in the policymaking process, it might have granted
an even more influential role to the
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Dartmouth Conference. In other words,
the meetings and briefings that the author recounts, involving many layers of
the U.S. government, probably provided
multiple points at which Dartmouth insights could enter U.S. policy.
The book’s second problem is rather
scant recognition that Dartmouth was
largely a “closed loop system” on the
Russian side, involving “the same, limited number of figures whom the Soviet
authorities permitted to have this kind
of access to Americans.” Undoubtedly,
the stalwarts of the cooperation from
the Institute of the USA and Canada
and other institutes had links into the
Soviet policy-making system. Nevertheless, the limitations on who could participate meant that for many years the
dialogue lacked access to key areas of
expertise, such as arms control, on the
Russian side—a fact that Voorhees
freely acknowledges.
It is also worth considering whether the
benefits of a close and continuing relationship with a few chosen people were,
in the end, the dialogue’s downfall. In
the 1990s, as more and more Russian
experts from a variety of institutions
became available, they migrated into a
plethora of international security and
policy forums. Because it was full to
capacity, however, the Dartmouth
Conference was not always able to accommodate this “new blood.” One
Russian participant expressed the dilemma well: “We have lost our audience. The government isn’t interested,
and besides our institutes have lost
their influence.”
Despite these problems, the Dartmouth
process clearly played a vital role in developing communications between the
two superpowers during the Cold War.
As this book makes clear, the
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conference’s legacy will abide in the
conflict-resolution techniques to which
it gave life.
ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

Senior Associate,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Lipsky, David. Absolutely American: Four Years at
West Point. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.
336pp. $25

Steven Covey advises us to start with
the end in mind, so here it is. If the
reader knows of a young person who
aspires to attend a college-level military
academy, any one of them, give that
person this book to read, cover to cover.
David Lipsky has written an entertaining and sobering book about life as it is
lived at the U.S. Military Academy. He
did so by living in Highland Falls, New
York, for four years and by having unprecedented daily access to the cadet
students and their mentors. The book
inspires, using a quiet style of observation that captures the poignancy and
irony of moments without being
judgmental.
Lipsky, a journalist for Rolling Stone
magazine, periodically chronicles modern college campus life. He admits to
having been reluctant to take on the
West Point assignment, because he had
been brought up not to like the military. Jann Wenner, his publisher and
boss, convinced him otherwise.
So, as the author states in the preface,
he learned to road-march, live and navigate in the woods, recognize ranks, and
absorb other basic military knowledge.
Along the way, he experienced an epiphany: “Not only was the Army not the
awful thing my father had imagined, it
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